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Abstract 
 
We propose a performance evaluation method for 
security protocols. Based on the informal specification, 
we construct a canonical model which includes, 
alongside protocol messages, cryptographic 
operations performed by participants in the process of 
message construction. Each cryptographic operation is 
assigned a cost modeled as a function of the size of 
processed message components. We model not only the 
size of regular message components but also the size of 
ciphertext produced by various cryptographic 
operations. We illustrate the applicability of our 
method by comparatively analyzing the performance of 
the original CCITT X.509 protocol and a slightly 
modified version of the same protocol. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Security protocols are “communication protocols 
dedicated to achieving security goals” (C.J.F. Cremers 
and S. Mauw) [1] such as confidentiality, integrity or 
availability. Achieving such security goals is made 
through the use of cryptography. 
Designing new protocols is a challenging task if we 
look at the number of attacks that have been discovered 
over the years [2] after the protocols have been 
published. However, in the last few years the use of 
protocol composition [3, 4, 5] has been successfully 
applied to create new protocols based on existing [6, 7] 
or predefined protocols [3]. 
The composition process makes use of the informal 
[6] specification of security protocols which does not 
include any implementation-related information such as 
selected cryptographic algorithm, key size or 
encryption rounds. The result of the composition can 
have multiple protocols [8] from which the most 
performant must be selected. 
As mentioned earlier, cryptography is an important 
component of these protocols. This is why existing 
performance evaluation methods include several 
aspects related to the performance of the algorithms 
used to implement the protocols. However, in the 
composition phase, the cryptographic algorithms used 
in the implementation process are unknown. 
To help the decision process related to the selection 
of the most performant security protocol, in the early 
design phase, we propose a novel evaluation method 
that focuses on cryptographic algorithm operations, 
available in the informal specification.  
The informal specification does not include a formal 
tool for reasoning on security protocols. In order to 
achieve our goal, we need such a tool. We have chosen 
to use the strand space model [9] as a specification 
model because of its simplicity and extensibility. 
However, additional information has to be included in 
the strand-based specification for our goal to be 
achievable. This is why we first construct an extension 
of the strand space model, called k-strand space, by 
enriching it with user knowledge and explicit term 
construction. 
The second step is to define the operations that can 
be extracted from the informal specification and to 
model them appropriately using a canonical model 
called t-strand space. The canonical model is 
constructed from the previously defined k-strand 
model. Because the size of message components of the 
same type (e.g. random numbers, participant names) is 
not known, in the t-strand model, message components 
are constructed from t-terms denoting only message 
types, without any instance-specific values. Based on 
these terms, we define cryptographic operations used 
by participants to construct messages. 
The proposed performance evaluation method 
evaluates two protocols against each other. For each 
protocol, the t-strand model is constructed together 
with all cryptographic operations needed for 
participants to construct the messages. Each 
cryptographic operation is assigned a symbolic cost. 
The performance of the two protocols is given as the 
sum of assigned costs and the final values are 
compared to each other. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In 
Section 2 we present an extension of the original strand 
space used to model security protocols and we 
introduce the canonical model where cryptographic 
operations are modeled as t-strands having specific 
classifiers. In Section 3 we provide a collection of 
functions for mapping the cost of each operation and 
the size of message components. Using the proposed 
approach, we evaluate the performance of two 
protocols in Section 4: the CCITT X.509 and a slightly 
modified version of the same protocol. In Section 5 we 
relate our work to others found in the literature. We 
end with a conclusion in Section 6. 
 
2. K-strands and t-strands 
 
In this section we briefly present the concept of 
knowledge strands (k-strands) and typed strands (t-
strands) used to model protocol participants. For a 
more detailed presentation, the reader is asked to 
consult the authors previous work [10]. 
 
2.1 K-strands and k-strand spaces 
 
A strand is a sequence of transmission and reception 
events used to model protocol participants. A 
collection of strands is called a strand space. The 
strand space model was introduced by Guttman et all in 
[9] and extended by the authors with participant 
knowledge, specialized basic sets and explicit term 
construction in [10]. The resulting model is called a k-
strand space. The rest of this section formally defines 
the k-strand and k-strand space concepts. 
By analyzing the protocol specifications from the 
SPORE library [11] we can conclude that protocol 
participants communicate by exchanging terms 
constructed from elements belonging to the following 
sets: R, denoting the set of participant names; N, 
denoting the set of nonces (i.e. “number once used”); 
K, denoting the set of cryptographic keys and M 
denoting user-defined components. If required, other 
sets can be easily added without affecting the other 
components. 
To denote the encryption type used to create 
cryptographic terms, we define the following function 
names: 
 FuncName ::=  sk  (secret key) 
          | pk  (public key) 
          | pvk (private key) 
          | h    (hash) 
 
The above-defined basic sets and function names 
are used in the definition of terms, where we also 
introduce constructors for pairing and encryption: 
( ) { } ( ):: . | | | | | , | FuncName= TT T T TR N K M , 
where the ‘.’ symbol is used to denote an empty term. 
We use the symbol ∗T  to denote the set of all subsets 
of terms. 
To denote the transmission and reception of terms, 
we use signed terms. The occurrence of a term with a 
positive sign denotes transmission, while the 
occurrence of a term with a negative sign denotes 
reception. The set of transmission and reception 
sequences is denoted by ( )∗±T . 
 
Definition 1. A k-strand (i.e. knowledge strand) is a 
tuple , ,r sK , where ∗∈K T denotes the knowledge 
corresponding to the modeled participant, r ∈R  
denotes the participant name and ( )s ∗∈ ±T denotes 
the sequence of transmissions and receptions. A set of 
k-strands is called a k-strand space. The set of all k-
strand spaces is denoted by kΣ . Let kς  be a k-strand 
space and k ks ς∈  a k-strand, then: 
1. We define the following mapping functions: 
( )kkknow s  to map the knowledge component; 
( )kkpart s  to map the name component; 
( )kkseq s  to map the term sequence component; 
2. A node is any transmission or reception of a 
term, written as ( ) ,kn kseq s i= , where i is an 
integer satisfying the condition 
( )1 i klength s≤ ≤ . We define the ( )kstrand n  
function to map the k-strand corresponding to a 
given node; 
3. Let ( )1 ,kn kseq s i=  and 
( )2 , 1kn kseq s i= +  be two consecutive nodes 
from the same k-strand. Then, there exists an 
edge 1 2n n⇒  in the same k-strand; 
4. Let 1 2,n n  be two nodes. If 1n  is a positive node 
and 1n  is a negative node and 
( ) ( )1 2kstrand n kstrand n≠ , then there exists an 
edge 1 2n n→ . 
 
Figure 1 shows an example graphical specification 
of Lowe’s BAN Concrete Secure RPC [2] protocol in 
the described k-strand space model. The protocol is 
modeled as the k-strand space { },k kA kBs sς = , where 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Lowe’s BAN Concrete Andrew Secure 
RPC representation in the k-strand space model 
 
{ } ( ) { } ( ), , , , , , , , , ,ABkA a AB a a sk Ks A B N K A A N N K B= + −
   { } ( ) ,a bsk KN N+ −  and 
{ } ( ), , , , , , , ,kB b AB as B A N K K B A N= −   
 { } ( ) { } ( ), , , ,ABa a bsk K sk KN K B N N+ − + . 
 
2.2 T-strands and t-strand spaces 
 
In this section we present the t-strand space model 
used in the following sections, which is a slightly 
modified version of the one proposed by the authors in 
[9]. The model from [9] is enriched with t-strand 
classifiers to denote cryptographic operations 
corresponding to protocol participants. Thus, protocol 
participants are modeled using a collection of t-strands. 
As opposed to k-strands, in the t-strand model the 
terms exchanged between t-strands are based on types 
constructed from basic typed terms and are called typed 
terms or more simply t-terms. Formally, basic typed 
terms and typed terms are defined as: 
 
BasicTT ::= r  (participants) 
        | n  (random numbers) 
        | k  (keys) 
        | m  (user-defined) 
 
( ) { }:: . | | , |t t t t FuncNameBasicTT=T T T T  
 
By using the above-defined syntactical components 
we model the instance-independence of security 
protocols which is a key aspect in the performance 
evaluation methods that follow in the next sections. 
Before defining the concept of typed strands we 
need to define another element: classifiers. As 
suggested by their names, classifiers are used to 
classify or categorize typed strands. The categories are 
created based on the type of operation modeled by a 
given typed strand. Formally, classifiers are defined as: 
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Classifiers such as encrypt, decrypt, hash, key and 
nonce generation, concatenation and split are given to 
typed strands denoting cryptographic operations 
specific to protocol participants. On the other hand, the 
process classifier is given to typed strands used to 
denote the operations that link together all other classes 
of typed strands. In other words, process t-strands 
model the handling of t-terms and cryptographic 
operations. 
A typed strand intuitively defines a sequence of t-
term transmissions and receptions. Similarly to the k-
strand model, we introduce ( )∗± tT  to denote the set of 
t-term transmission and reception sequences. T-strands 
are defined as follows: 
  
Definition 2. A t-strand (i.e. typed strand) is a tuple 
, ,r sc , with ∈c C , r ∈R  and ( )s ∗∈ ± tT . A set of t-
strands is called a t-strand space. The set of all t-
strand spaces is denoted by tΣ . Let tς  be a t-strand 
space and t ts ς∈  a t-strand, then: 
1. We define the following mapping functions: 
( )ttclass s  to map the classifier component; 
( )ttpart s  to map the name component; 
( )ttseq s  to map the t-term sequence 
component; 
2. A t-node is any transmission or reception of a t-
term, written as ( ) ,t tn tseq s i= , where i is an 
integer satisfying the condition 
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● 
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{ }, , , ,a ABA A B N K  { }, , , , ,b ABB B A N K K  
, aA N  
{ } ( ), , ABa sk KN K B  
{ } ( )a sk KN  
bN  
( )1 i tlength s≤ ≤ . We define the ( )tstrand n  
function to map the t-strand corresponding to a 
given t-node; 
3. Let ( )1 ,tn tseq s i=  and ( )2 , 1tn tseq s i= +  
be two consecutive t-nodes from the same t-
strand. Then, there exists an edge 1 2n n⇒  in 
the same t-strand; 
4. Let 1 2,n n  be two t-nodes. If 1n  is a positive t-
node and 1n  is a negative t-node and 
( ) ( )1 2tstrand n tstrand n≠ , then there exists an 
edge 1 2n n→ . 
 
In Figure 2 we have the t-strand graphical 
representation of the protocol from Figure 1. Here, we 
have intentionally ommitted the representation of 
cryptographic operations (e.g. encryption, decryption), 
which will be discussed in the next section. The 
corresponding t-strand model is { },t tA tBs sς = , where 
( ) { } { }, , , , , , , ,tA sk sks A r n n k r n n= + − + −RC  and 
( ) { } { }, , , , , , , ,tB sk sks B r n n k r n n= − + − +RC . 
 
2.3 Modeling cryptographic operations 
 
Usually, protocol specifications do not include 
cryptographic operations such as term concatenation, 
encryption or signature generation, which are 
considered to be implementation-specific. However, 
when dealing with the performance evaluation of these 
protocols we can not omit such operations because they 
directly influence the evaluation process. 
By using the defined classifiers and typed strands, 
we can model cryptographic operations as follows. 
 
Definition 3. Let ∈c C  be a classifier. Then the typed 
strands corresponding to this classifier generate the 
following sequences of transmissions and receptions 
for any ,t tt t′ ∈ tT : 
Encryption. { },t t skt t− + , if = Ec C ; 
Decryption. { } ,t tskt t− + , if = Dc C ; 
Hash. { },t t ht t− + , if = Hc C ; 
Public key enc. { },t t pkt t− + , if = PKc C ; 
Private key enc. { },t t pvkt t− + , if = PVKc C ; 
Key-Gen. k+ , if =
K
c C ; 
Nonce-Gen. n+ , if =
N
c C ; 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Lowe’s BAN Concrete Andrew Secure 
RPC representation in the t-strand space model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Encrypted type term generation model 
 
Concatenation. ( ), , ,t t t tt t t t′ ′− − + , if = Cc C ; 
Split. ( ), , ,t t t tt t t t′ ′− + + , if = Ic C . 
 
Executing a sequence of cryptographic operations 
produces the terms needed to construct other terms. For 
example, if we consider the specification given in 
Figure 2, for the first typed term to be transmitted, a 
random number has to be generated, followed by the 
concatenation of two typed terms. The second typed 
term, { }n, k, r
sk , requires a key generation, the 
concatenation of three t-terms and the application of a 
secret key-based encryption function. The graphical 
representation of the complete construction of the 
{ }n, k, r
sk  t-term is shown in Figure 3.  
 
3. Performance evaluation functions 
 
Using the k-strand model, the operations that must 
be executed by protocol participants are extracted and 
the t-strand model is constructed. The extraction 
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process uses the knowledge corresponding to each k-
strand to identify operations. Thus, terms that are not in 
the participant’s knowledge must be generated (i.e. 
keys, random numbers) or extracted from encrypted 
terms which are also located in the knowledge set. 
In this paper we consider that for each positive node 
(i.e. sent terms), terms are extracted from knowledge. If 
they do not exist, they are generated or extracted from 
other encrypted terms. In the case of negative nodes 
(i.e. received terms), we consider that terms are placed 
in the participant’s knowledge. Decryption of terms 
available in the knowledge set is executed only when 
needed (i.e. on sending terms). However, participants 
may need to verify received terms, thus execute 
decryption operations on every negative node. This 
requires additional information to be added to the t-
strand model, which we consider to be part of a future 
work. 
In the t-strand model, the t-nodes responsible for 
creating new t-terms have a positive sign. Thus, we 
assign a cost to each positive t-node found in a t-strand 
space. 
We define the following functions to denote the cost 
of each operation: 
, , , , , , :sk pk h kg ng s pf f f f f f f + +→ℝ ℝ  
:cf + + +× →ℝ ℝ ℝ , 
where skf denotes symmetric key-based operations, pkf  
denotes public and private key-based operations, hf  
denotes hash operations, kgf  denotes key generation 
operations, 
ngf  denotes nonce generation operations, 
sf  denotes split operations, pf  denotes processing 
operations and 
cf  denotes concatenation operations. 
Each function takes as argument the size of the t-term 
to be processed and returns the cost of each operation. 
The kgf and ngf functions receive the size of the t-term 
to be created. The 
cf function receives two arguments: 
the size of the two t-terms to be concatenated. 
Term size plays an important role in the 
performance of security protocols. Because of this, we 
define several functions to map the size of t-terms to 
symbolic values. 
The size of each basic typed term is mapped to a 
symbolic value using the _ : BasicTT +→ ℝ operator. 
By applying cryptographic operations on t-terms, the 
size of the result depends on the type of the algorithm  
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Figure 4. Cleartext and ciphertext  size for 
symmetrical, hash and asymmetrical algorithms 
 
that is used [12] (i.e. symmetrical, asymmetrical or 
hash). In order to model the resulting size, we 
conducted an exhaustive measurement of the ciphertext 
size resulted by applying cryptographic algorithms on 
cleartext of various size. The implementations were 
chosen from two well-known cryptographic libraries: 
Cryptlib [13] and OpenSSL [14]. 
From the results shown in Figure 4 we can clearly 
state that the size of ciphertext resulting from hash 
operations is the same for any cleartext while the size 
of ciphertext resulting from symmetrical cryptographic 
operations follows the size of cleartext. In contrast, the 
size of ciphertext resulting from asymmetrical 
operations is much greater than the original cleartext 
and strongly depends on the length of the key used in 
the process [15]. 
We introduce the , , :S A Hλ λ λ +→ ℝtT functions to 
map the size of ciphertext resulted by applying 
symmetrical, asymmetrical and hash operations 
respectively, on t-terms. We also introduce the 
: +∆ → ℝ
t
T  function to map the size of concatenated 
t-terms. These functions are defined inductively as: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) { }
( ) ( ) { } { }
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where HashS
+∈ℝ is a constant denoting the size of hash 
ciphertext and :AsymS
+ +→ℝ ℝ is a function that maps 
the size of asymmetric ciphertext based on the size of 
cleartext. 
 
4. Example performance evaluation 
 
As an example on the usage of our proposed 
evaluation method, we use the CCITT X.509 one 
message protocol proposed by M. Abadi and R. 
Needham [16] as a recommendation for the 
CCITT.X.509 standard. 
The k-strand graphical representation of the 
protocol is given in Figure 6. We kept the original term 
notations for clarity, such that ,a aT N ∈N , 
,a aX Y ∈M and ,A B ∈R . , , ,A B A BPK PK SK SK ∈K are 
asymmetric keys corresponding to the public and 
private keys of the two participants.
 
The performance of the protocol from Figure 6 is 
evaluated against another protocol with a slightly 
modified structure. We modify the term signed with the 
private key of participant A, which becomes 
{ } ( )( ){ } ( ), , , , B Aa a a a pk PK sk SKT h N B X Y , 
while the rest of the message remains the same. 
Next, by using the t-strand model of the two 
protocols we prove that the slight modification results 
in a much less performant protocol. Because of space 
considerations, we only construct and analyze the t-
term containing the differences between the two 
protocols. The remaining t-terms do not influence the 
results because the overhead is identical for both 
protocols. 
The graphical representation of the constructed t-
strand corresponding to the operations executed by 
participant A in the first protocol is given in Figure 7. 
The operations executed by participant B are the 
inverse of these. 
The cost of the operations executed by participant A 
in the original CCITT X.509 protocol is the sum of the 
costs of individual operations. For example, the cost of 
the public key operation in the t-strand with 
classifier
PK
C , denoted by a positive t-node, is 
( )( )pkf m∆  and the cost of the private key operation in 
the t-strand with classifier 
PVK
C  also denoted by a 
positive t-node is { }{ }( )( )n,n,r,m, mpk pk hf ∆ =  
( )pk Hashf S . 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. K-strand representation of the CCITT 
X.509 protocol 
 
The cost of all operations performed by participant 
A is 
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Because of the reduced complexity of the 
concatenation and processing operations, we consider 
that the cost is the same for any concatenated or 
processed t-terms. We use the C
+Λ ∈ℝ  symbol to 
denote the cost of concatenation operations and the 
P
+Λ ∈ℝ symbol to denote the cost of processing 
operations. Thus, the cost becomes: 
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )
4
2
8 .
A
pk ng C
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pk Hash P
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f S
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Figure 7. Encrypted type term generation model 
 
The cost of the modified CCITT.X protocol is  
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In order to decide if the cost of the first protocol is 
smaller than the cost of the second protocol, we need to 
establish if A ACost Cost ′< , meaning that 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
2
.
pk Hash h Asym
h Asym pk Hash
f S f n r m S m
f n r m S m f n S
+ + + + <
+ + + + +
 
By examining the performance of security protocol 
algorithms from the literature [21], we conclude that  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2alg alg algf t f t f t Ovh∆ = ∆ + ∆ − , 
where ( )1 2,t t t= , alg FuncName∈ and Ovh is the 
overhead of preparing each term for cryptographic 
operations. The value of the overhead is specific to 
each cryptographic operation. 
Thus, the equation becomes 
( ) ( ) .h H pk Af n Ovh f r Ovh− < −  
If we ignore the overhead, which, compared to the 
actual cryptographic operation is insignificant, we can 
clearly state that the cost of the first protocol is smaller 
than the cost of the second protocol. This is why 
signature functions are usually applied on the hash of 
terms and not on the terms themselves. 
In the given example, the cost of the two protocols 
was evaluated against the operations performed by 
participant A. Because the given protocol is a two party 
protocol, the result would have been the same if we 
have also evaluated the cost of the operations 
performed by participant B. 
 
5. Related work 
 
In the literature we find several papers dealing with 
the performance evaluation of protocol 
implementations [17, 18]. In contrast, only a few 
papers are dedicated to constructing a model for the 
evaluation of security protocol performance [6, 12]. 
For completeness, we first mention a few papers that 
adopted the performance evaluation of various 
cryptographic algorithm and security protocol 
implementations. In [17] and [18], the performance of 
cryptographic algorithms is measured as a function of 
the total amount of energy consumed by the device on 
which the algorithm is running. For evaluating the 
performance of the WTLS [20] (Wireless Transport 
Layer Security) protocol, the authors from [21] 
measure the time needed to perform connections on a 
PDA. Finally, we mention the currently world wide 
adopted security protocol, TLS [19] (Transport Layer 
Security). The performance of TLS has been 
intensively studied [22, 23]. The results show that the 
cryptographic overhead introduced by TLS seriously 
affects the performance of regular servers. Because of 
this, several solutions have been proposed to improve 
server performance, from which we mention the 
distribution of cryptographic operations among other 
servers [23] and the use of hardware accelerators [24]. 
One of the papers dedicated to modeling the 
behavior of protocol components [12] constructs a 
parametric mathematical model based on an exhaustive 
evaluation process of algorithm implementations. The 
constructed model does not address, however, the issue 
of protocol cryptographic operations executed by 
participants. 
A similar approach to ours is proposed in [6] where 
cryptographic operations are detailed and each 
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operation is assigned a symbolic cost. Our approach 
differs by the fact that it introduces the concept of size 
based on term types, as opposed to instance values 
used in [6]. In addition, we also model the size of 
message components resulting from cryptographic 
operations, which is not covered in [6]. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have developed a procedure for evaluating the 
performance of security protocols. Our proposal is 
based on a canonical model which eliminates terms 
specific to protocol instantiations, leaving only types. 
The canonical model also includes cryptographic 
operations that must be executed by protocol 
participants in order to construct new terms. The total 
cost associated to cryptographic operations denotes the 
performance of the analyzed security protocol. 
The novelty of our approach lies in the use of 
participant knowledge to construct cryptographic 
operations, which does not need any user intervention 
and provides a minimal effort from participants to 
create protocol messages. Another novelty introduced 
by our approach is the association of typed terms to 
symbolic sizes and the modeling of ciphertext size 
resulting from cryptographic operations. 
As future work, we intend to introduce additional 
cryptographic operations denoting the verification of 
received terms. We also intend to use the proposed 
performance evaluation method in the composition 
process, which has been used as a method for designing 
new security protocols from existing protocols. Thus, 
designers could chose from an early stage the most 
performant protocol. 
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